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THE DEREGULATION OF COMMERCIAL
TELEVISION
I.

Introduction

In August 1984, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) released the Report and Order in the Matter of the
Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations (Deregulation Report and Order).' The
Deregulation Report and Order affects the FCC regulatiohs concerning programming policies, 2 ascertainment requirements, 3 program
1. In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization, Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report and Order, MM Docket No. 83-670 (Aug. 21, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Deregulation Report and Order]; see also In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Logging Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 94 F.C.C.2d 678 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation Notice].
In 1981, the Commission deregulated radio, eliminating or modifying the same
regulations that are affected by the TV Deregulation Report and Order:
Action taken herein resolves the issues raised in the Commission's Notice
of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, released September 27,
1979, In the Matter of the Deregulation of Radio. The Commission is
eliminating its current processing guidelines which commercial radio stations should provide and the number of commercial minutes per hour
which they should not exceed. Additionally, the Commission is eliminating
its community ascertainment requirement and its program log keeping
requirements for commercial radio stations. The action is being taken
to reduce the paperwork and other burdens on commercial radio stations
without having a substantial adverse impact upon the public interest.
49 PIKE AND FISCHER, RADIO REGULATIONS 2D SERIEs 3 (1981). See 84 F.C.C.2d 968,
recon. denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981); Office of Communication of United Christ
Church v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as UCC v. FCCI,
upholding the actions taken by the FCC, but remanding on the issue of eliminating
the program logging requirement and directing the FCC to "reconsider its decision,
this time giving adequate attention to the usefulness of programming logs in the
newly revised, overall scheme of broadcast regulation." Id. at 1418.
2. 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(a)(6)-(8) (1983); see Report and Statement of Policy Res:
Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). "Programming
policies" refer to the Federal Communications Commission's [hereinafter cited as
FCC] notion of balanced programming which the FCC has considered necessary
to fulfill the requirement under the Communications Act of 1934 that broadcasters
serve the public interest. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a historical
discussion of programming policies.
3. The "ascertainment of community needs" requirements are to insure that
broadcasters survey the public and the leaders in the communities they serve as
to what they perceive their own needs to be and what issues are important to
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logging rules 4 and commercialization policies.5 This action is part
of the FCC's continuing trend toward total deregulation of the

6
broadcast media.

The Television Deregulation Notice, which preceded the Deregulation Report and Order by one year, had proposed several options

for each of the above-mentioned areas, ranging from complete deletion of the particular regulation to slight modification of the existing
stringent rules and policies. 7 The Deregulation Report and Order

eliminated all formal ascertainment requirements 8 and programming
them. For the specific requirements, see In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants Part I, Sections IV-A and IV-B of FCC
Forms, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ascertainment Primer]. See
also infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of ascertainment
requirements. The term "ascertainment" refers to "the determination of community
needs through a set of special procedures." Comment, FCC Broadcast Standards
for Ascertaining Community Needs, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 56 n.10 (1976).
4. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1800-1840 (1983). The program logs required by the FCC
consisted of a detailed listing of virtually everything that the station has broadcast
during the day. The log had to be entered contemporaneously with the actual
broadcast. The log included the name of the program, a description of the category
(e.g., entertainment, public affairs, news) and the time of day that the program
begins and ends. Logs also were required for all program interruptions such as
advertisements, public service announcements and station identification. See also
infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text for a historical perspective of program
logging requirements.
5. Under the former FCC regulations, there was no specific limit on the number
of commercials a licensee could broadcast, but under 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(a)(7) (1983),
the Broadcast Bureau was required to refer renewal license applicants to the full
Commission for approval where the applicant proposes more than "16 minutes of
commercial matter per hour, or, during periods of high demand for political
advertising, providing for exceptions permitting in excess of 20 minutes of commercial
matter per hour during 10 per cent or more of the station's total weekly hours
of operation." Id. There also was a prohibition on program length commercials.
The Deregulation Notice proposed the elimination of the consideration of commercial time for license applicants or renewal applicants, or, as an alternative,
increasing the maximums set forth in the 1973 Delegation of Authority. Deregulation
Notice, supra note 1, at 704. This Note will not consider this portion of the
deregulation. See Amendment of Part 0 of the Commission's Rules - Commission
Organization - with Respect to Delegations of Authority to the Chief, Broadcast
Bureau, 43 F.C.C.2d 638 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Delegations of Authority].
For discussions of commercialization, see BOTEIN & RICE, NETWORK TELEVISION AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1980); KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 192-205 (1982).

6. See, e.g., In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, No. 84-282 (May 8, 1984); In re Repeal of the
"Regional Concentration of Control" Provisions of the Commission's Multiple
Ownership Rules, 96 F.C.C.2d 578 (1984); In re Deregulation of Radio, Report
and Order 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
7. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 700-07.
8. See Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 23-25.
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guidelines. 9 It also eliminated commercialization policy guidelines
and the prohibition against program length commercials. 0 Finally,
it significantly reduced program logging requirements which now will
be satisfied by quarterly filing of an issues/programs list by the
broadcaster. "
This Note analyzes these regulatory changes according the following
structure: first, a historical exposition of radio and television regulation in general 2 and of the areas affected by the deregulation
in particular;' 3 second, an assessment of the changes in the context
of the modern television marketplace; 4 and third, a discussion of
television content regulation and the first amendment. 5 This Note
concludes that, although the deregulation is a major step forward
in accommodating the changing broadcasting marketplace, the FCC
has not made any real progress on the crucial issue of full first
amendment protection in broadcasting.
II.
A.

Regulation: Past to Present

Early History

In the early 1920's, the number of radio broadcast stations licensed
by the Secretary of State of the Department of Commerce and Labor
under the Radio Act of 191216 began to increase rapidly. The competition for airtime resulted in interference on the airwaves, and
broadcasters attempted to make their programs heard by broadcasting
at higher volumes than did their competitors. 7 This only exacerbated
9. Id. at 4-5. However, the Commission noted that they "do not imply that
the programming obligations of broadcast licensees, as we have historically viewed
them, are not properly subject to review and revision in appropriate proceedings."
Id. at 2 n.2.
10. Id. at 29. "Program length commercials" are "programs into which so
much commercial consideration is interwoven that the entire program becomes a
commercial." BITTNER, BROADCAST LAW AND REGULATION 239 (1982).
11. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 34-35. The decision to
require a quarterly programs list was influenced by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in UCC v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
where the court questioned whether an annual list, limited to 10 issues, "could
provide a significant guage of a station's overall public service performance."
Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 33.
12. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 83-115 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
16. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, § 1, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
17. See EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 23-24 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as

EMERY].

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XIII

the problem, and both the public and the broadcasters appealed to
the government to remedy the situation."8
Gradually, it became clear that the Secretary had no power, under
the 1912 Act, to control the problems that were arising in the
broadcast industry.' 9 The Secretary had no authority to refuse a
license merely because it would cause interference with other licensed
broadcasters 2° nor could he assign hours of operation 2' or even require
licensees to use only their assigned frequencies. 22
In response to the critical need for further legislation, Congress
passed the Radio Act of 1927,23 which was
intended to regulate all forms of interstate and foreign radio
transmissions and communications ...to maintain the control of

the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign
radio transmission and to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof,[ 24 ] by individuals, firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time under licenses granted by
Federal authority.

25

The Radio Act of 1927 established the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC) as the licensing authority. 26 The FRC, which was given broad
rule-making powers, assigned frequencies or wavelengths as the "public convenience, interest, or necessity require[d]. ' ' 27 The FRC expressed its licensing and regulatory policies and its interpretation of
the standard of public convenience, interest or necessity in In re
18. Id.at 24-26.
19. The 1912 Act "gave the Secretary no discretionary power. There were no
general standards by which he could choose among applicants for stations." EMERY,
supra note 17, at 17. The Secretary was merely to grant licenses and enforce the
minimal regulations set forth in the 1912 Act. Id.
20. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. App. 1923), appeal dismissed, 266 U.S. 636 (1924).
21. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp, 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. 111.1926); see
also 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926). Attorney General William Donovan's response
to Secretary of Commerce and Labor Hoover's request for a definition of duties
and powers under the Radio Act of 1912, stated that Donovan agreed with the
Zenith holding that Hoover had no express power under the act to establish
regulations. Id.
22. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126.
23. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162-74 (1927).
24. This specific emphasis on the fact that licensees are not owners of the frequencies which they are licensed by the government to use is frequently cited
by those who use the public trustee theory to support a denial of equal first
amendment privileges for the broadcast media and the print media. See infra notes
124-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "public trustee" theory of
broadcast licensing.
25. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
26. Id. at 1163-64.
27. Id. at 1163.
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Great Lakes BroadcastingCompany.2 8 The FRC asserted its authority
to inquire into the programming content of broadcast stations by
indicating that the broadcasters had a duty to "serve the entire
listening public within the service area of a station." 9 This duty
included the requirement that
the tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the
listening public should be met, in some fair proportion, by a wellrounded program in which entertainment consisting of music of
both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important public events, discussions of public questions,
weather, market reports and news and matters of interest to all
members of the family find a place."
The FRC noted that there existed two safeguards to insure that
a broadcaster would meet the public needs: first, the listener could
"exercis[e] his complete power of censorship by turning his dial
away,"'" and second, the FRC could review past performance when
applications were made for renewal of licences or when others applied
32
to take over a particular broadcaster's license.
The Communications Act of 1934 (Act),33 which adopted many
of the provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 in its section pertaining
to broadcast regulation, also established the FCC.3 4 Originally, the
28. In re Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32
(1929), rev'd in part on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed,
281 U.S. 706 (1930).
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Communications Act 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982)).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible,
to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable changes, for the purpose of the rational defense, for the
purpose of promoting the safety of life and property through the use
of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing a
more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore
granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority
with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a commission to be known as the "Federal
Communications Commission", which shall be constituted as hereinafter
provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter.
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FCC's programming requirements,35 ascertainment requirements, 3 6
logging rules3" and limits on commercialization 38 stemmed from the
notion that the "public interest" 3 9 required the type of balanced
programming that was described in In the Matter of the Application
40
of Great Lakes Broadcasting Company.
B.

Programming Policies

In 1946, the FCC issued a Report on Public Service Responsibility
of Broadcast Licensees (the Blue Book),4' in which the commission
set forth its policies concerning a "well-balanced program structure. ' ' n2 The Blue Book indicated that local talent programs, discussions of public issues, programs covering religious, educational
and civic matters, local news and market reports had to be included
43
in a licensee's programming.
Although the Commission did not require a specific quantity of

time to be devoted to each type of programming, it indicated that
an "adequate amount of time" during "the good listening hours"

would be required." In 1960, the FCC issued a report which reiterated
the policies set forth in the Blue Book but which listed the "major
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs, and

desires of the community in which the station is located as developed
by the industry, and recognized by the commission.

' 45

35. See supra note 2.
36. See supra note 3.
37. See supra note 4.
38. See supra note 5.
39. Section 309(a) of the Communications Act states that the F.C.C. will
only grant a license if it finds that the "public interest, convenience and necessity
would be served by the granting thereof." 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982). The Commission from its inception has taken the position that programming in the public
interest means diversity in programming, balanced programming and responsiveness
to local community concerns. The need for public affairs programs, news, educational and religious programs in addition to entertainment has been emphasized
throughout the Commission's existence. See infra notes 41-68 and accompanying
text.
40. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
41. FCC internal document (available at the FCC library, Washington, D.C.).
42. Id.
43. Id. This stance taken by the Commission is an outgrowth of the early view
of the "public interest" standard set forth in section 309(a) of the Communications
Act of 1934. See In re Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann.
Rep. at 32.
44. Id.
45. Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission En Banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Programming
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The Commission noted in the 1960 Programming Statement that
it "d[id] not intend to guide the licensee along the path of pro' 47
gramming, '46 that it would "steer clear of the bans of censorship
and that it would not establish specific quantitative programming

requirements .48
Through the Deregulation Report and Order, 49 the FCC eliminated
the application of the "promise versus performance" standard in
the case of uncontested license renewals.5 0 The Commission states
that this decision was based upon the following "fundamental considerations:"'" the belief that licensees would continue to broadcast
the type of programming required by the guidelines, even in their
absence, in response to marketplace incentives 2 and the FCC's conclusion that the guidelines may have conflicted with the policies
underlying the Regulatory Flexibility Act53 and the Paperwork Re-

Statement]. These elements are:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of
local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6) public affairs programs[,] (7) editorialization by
licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs[,j (1[0]) news
programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports programs, (13)
service to minority groups, [and] (14) entertainment programs.
Id.
46. Id. at 2316.

47. Id. This statement on the part of the FCC is rather superfluous given that
Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934 specifically prohibits censorship.
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
48. 1960 Programming Statement, supra note 45, at 2314. But see 1973 Delegations of Authority, supra note 5, which requires that the Broadcast Bureau refer
license applications proposing less than 10% non-entertainment programming to
the full Commission for approval. Id. at 640. See also In re Amendment to Section
0.281 of the Commission's Rules: Delegations of .Authority to the Chief, Broadcast
Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 493 (1976), which further specifies the guidelines to be
a minimum 5% "local" and 5% "informational" programming. 47 C.F.R. §
0.283(a)(7)(ii)(A) (1983) sets forth the current standard.
49. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 4.
50. Id. The promise versus performance standard consisted of a comparison of
the type of programming a licensee proposed in the license application to the
programs actually broadcast by the licensee. This standard was applied by the
Commission where the renewal was not contested.
51. Id.

52. Id. In fact, the FCC states that "the guidelines appear to have no impact
on the levels of informational (news and public affairs) programming." Id. at 10.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1980).
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duction Act.14 Furthermore, the FCC considered the costs of compliance and the "possibly unnecessary infringement on the editorial

discretion of broadcasters" 55 as important factors in favor of eliminating the programming guidelines.

C.

Ascertainment

The 1960 Progamming Statement also contained the new FCC
policies with regard to the ascertainment of community needs and
interests.16 The FCC emphasized that it would not accept program
proposals or letters of praise from the public in satisfaction of its
requirements but that a specific ascertainment procedure would have
7
to be followed by license applicants.1
The confusion arising from differing interpretations given by license
applicants to the ascertainment portion of application forms caused
the Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA) to request a
clarification of the FCC ascertainment standards. 8 As a result, in
1971, the FCC published a list of guidelines known as the "Ascertainment Primer." 59
The Ascertainment Primer details appropriate ascertainment pro-

cedures for license applicants.6° A separate "Renewal Primer" was

54. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note I, at 4-5; see Paperwork Re-

duction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1980).
55. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 5.
56. 1960 Programming Statement, supra note 45, at 2314-18.
57. Id. at 2316.
What we propose will not be served by preplanned program format
submissions accompanied by complementary references from local citizens.
What we propose is documented program submissions prepared as a
result of assiduous planning and consultation covering two main areas:
first, a canvas of the listening public who will receive the signal and
who constitute a definite public interest figure; second, consultation with
leaders in community life ....
Id.
58. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 719 n.10 (Separate Statement of
Commissioner Mimi Weyforth Dawson).
59. In re Primer of Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
60. The Ascertainment Primer is a detailed guide for license applicants to follow.
It explains the purpose of each question pertaining to ascertainment on application
forms and what is needed to constitute satisfactory compliance.
[Tlhe Primer require[d] the license applicant to: (1) draw up a detailed
demographic outline of the community; (2) determine significant community groups from the outline; (3) conduct interviews with leaders of
each "significant group" to discuss community needs; (4) undertake a
survey of the general public to discuss community needs; and (5) propose
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adopted in 1975 for renewal license applicants. 6' The FCC required
that ascertainment be conducted on an annual basis. 62 The results
of ascertainment and programming proposals to conform with com6
munity needs were to be filed with license and renewal applications.
The Deregulation Report and Order eliminated formal ascertain-

ment obligations completely 64 and abolished the Ascertainment
Primers. 65 The FCC has concluded that these regulations are unnecessary because licensees will become aware of community interests
even in the absence of formal requirements. 66 Furthermore, the thenexisting procedures for ascertainment imposed significant costs on
the licensees where less costly methods of the licensees own choosing
might have been equally effective.67 Finally, the FCC seems to believe
that competition in the marketplace is continually increasing, so that
''commercial necessity dictates that broadcasters must remain aware
68
of the issues of the community.
D.

Program Logging Rules

Although program logging requirements have existed in some form
since regulation under the FRC, 69 they have increased steadily over
the years. 70 Under the FRC rules, 7' broadcasters were required to
programming to meet the needs and problems of the community as
ascertained from the prescribed studies ....
Comment, FCC Broadcast Standards for Ascertaining Community Needs, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
61. In re Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57
F.C.C.2d 418 (1976), recon. granted in part, 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Renewal Primer]; see Bamford v. FCC, 535 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(court upheld denial of new license by FCC for failure to conduct ascertainment
under primer guidance), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976).
62. Ascertainment Primer, supra note 59.
63. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 685-87. However, In re Ascertainment
of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants: Small Market Ascertainment
Exemption, 86 F.C.C.2d 798 (1981), exempts renewal applicants serving communities
of 10,000 or less from the ascertainment requirements on the theory that these
broadcasters are "sufficiently familiar with their communities to enable them to
develop responsive programming without the substantive administrative burdens
associated with formal ascertainment procedures." Deregulation Notice, supra note
1,at 687.
64. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 23.
65. See supra notes 59, 61.
66. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 23-24.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 24.
69. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 687.
70. Id.at 688.
71. 5 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 96 (1931).
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log all station and call announcements and the time of their broadcast
72
and also to enter a description of all programs.
In 1934, the FRC established requirements that broadcasters log
all programs by category73 and log all political speeches along with
74
the name and party of the politician represented by the speech.
The FCC revised the logging rules in 196611 "to require the contemporaneous maintenance of a comprehensive record of programs
by specific categories."7 6 The logging rules required not only a precise
record of what had been shown throughout the broadcast day but
also specified the manner in which these logs were to be entered
and kept and the length of time they were to be retained for public
77

inspection .
In determining its latest action with regard to logging requirements,
the Commission was careful to consider the court of appeals' decision

72. Id.

73. F.R.C. Rules and Regulations § 172(A) (1934).
74. Id.; see Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 688.
75. In re Amendment of § 3.663(a) (now § 73.670). The Program Logging
Rules for Television Broadcast Stations, 5 F.C.C.2d 185 (1966).
76. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 688.
77. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1800-1840. See also ELLMORE, BROADCASTING LAW & REGULATION 166 (1982), which summarizes the extensive former program logging requirements as follows:
The employee keeping the log must sign it when starting duty and again
when going off duty. Logs must be kept in an orderly and legible manner.
Key letters or abbreviations may be used if proper meaning or explanation
is contained elsewhere in the log. Each sheet must be numbered and
dated. Time entries must be made in local time and must indicate whether
it is advanced (daylight savings) or nonadvanced time. Any necessary
corrections of a manually kept log may be made only by striking out
the erroneous portion and making a corrective explanation on the log
or attachment to it. The corrections must be dated and signed by the
person who kept the log, the program director, the station manager, or
an officer of the licensee. No program log may be erased, willfully
destroyed during the two years logs are required to be retained. ...
Program logs must contain (1) [an entry identifying the program by
name or title, (2) [e]ntries that indicate the time each program begins
and ends, (3) lain entry classifying each program as to type.
Id.
For commercial stations the FCC lists eight types of programs and three
subcategories of programs.
For noncommercial educational stations the FCC lists seven types of
programs.
An entry classifying each program as to source. For commercial stations
the FCC lists three sources of programs: local programs (L), network
programs (NET), and recorded programs (REC).... An entry for each
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in Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC.8
In that case, which concerned the deregulation of radio, the court
questioned the Commission's decision to eliminate program logs and
to require only an annual issues/programs list.7 9
The Deregulation Report and Order concluded that "the best
method of documentation suitable and adequate to our new regu-

latory scheme for television broadcasting is a quarterly issues/programs list requirement." 80 As in the decisions regarding ascertainment
and programming guidelines, 8 the cost and burden to the licensee
of the comprehensive log requirement and the questionable need for

it under the new regulatory scheme were among the primary con2
siderations in minimizing the logging requirements.1
III.
A.

The Deregulation: An Assessment

The Sources of Regulation

The rules concerning programming policy, ascertainment and program logging are all FCC-made regulations. 83 The Supreme Court
program representing a political candidate, showing the name and political
affiliation of such candidate. For commercial matter: 1. An entry identifying the sponsor(s), the person(s) who paid for the announcement or
the person(s) who furnished materials or services.
Id. at 166-67 (requirements pertaining to public service announcements, other
announcements, and emergency broadcast systems operations are omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
78. UCC v. FCC, supra note 1.
79. Id. at 1438-42.
80. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 33-34.
This list is to be placed in a station's public inspection file and it should
contain, in narrative form, a brief description of at least five to ten
issues to which the licensee gave particular attention with programming
in the past three months with a statement of how each issue was treated.
The list also is to include information pertaining to the date and time
of broadcast and the duration of listed programming.
Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
81. See supra notes 52-55, 66-68 and accompanying text.
82. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 34. For a thorough
discussion of the Commission's reasoning, see id. at 33-36.
83. Programming Content, 47 C.F.R. § 0.283 (a)(7) (1983); Logging Rules, 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.1800-1840 (1983); In re Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1976) [Renewal Primer], recon. granted
in part, 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976); In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community
Problems by Broadcast Applicants, Part 1, Sections IV-A and IV-B of FCC Forms,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) [Ascertainment Primer].
The only specific statutory requirements related to broadcast content are the
equal opportunity requirement, the reasonable access rule, the sponsorship an-
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has held that instituting such regulations is within the jurisdiction

of the FCC and that such regulations are an appropriate means for
carrying out its responsibility to insure that broadcasters serve the
"public convenience, interest and necessity" as required by the
Communications Act of 1934.14 Therefore, it is equally within the
discretion of the FCC to determine that such rules should be eliminated or modified as has been done in the Deregulation Report
and Order.
nouncement rules and possibly the fairness doctrine.
The "equal opportunity rule" requires that licensees afford equal opportunities
to all legally qualified candidates for a public office, once one such candidate has
been permitted to use the broadcast station. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
The "reasonable access rule" states:
The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit...
for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on
behalf of his candidacy.
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
The "sponsorship announcement rule" states:
All matter broadcast for which any money, service or other valuable
consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged
or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at
the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished,
as the case may be, by such person ....
47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (1982). This section goes on to define specific situations
where sponsorship announcement will be required and it also gives the FCC power
to "prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
section." 47 U.S.C. § 317(b), (d), (e) (1982).
The Fairness Doctrine imposes two duties upon broadcast licensees: 1) the duty
to devote broadcast time to controversial issues of public importance and 2) the
duty, when such programming is presented, to insure that it is balanced overall;
that is, to provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
views. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982); see also NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). The FCC is currently considering the
elimination of the Fairness Doctrine. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Gen. Docket No. 84-282 (May 8, 1984) [hereinafter cited as FairnessInquiry]. The Commission points out in the Fairness Inquiry
that one of the primary questions to be explored is whether or not Congress has
vested the Commission "under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and,
in particular, under the 1959 legislative amendments to Section 315 of the Act
[with] the Agency discretion to significantly modify or even repeal the fairness
doctrine." Id. at 4; see 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
84. An early interpretation of this standard by the court can be found in In
re Application of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929),
modified, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); see
also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933).
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The Arguments for and against Deregulation

The FCC and proponents of the deregulation base their support
on two specific considerations.85 First, they claim that today's tel-

evision marketplace is substantially different from that of ten to
twenty-five years ago when these regulations were made and that
this new, highly competitive marketplace will ensure the results that
these regulations were intended to achieve.8 6 Secondly, supporters of
deregulation claim that the costs of complying with the regulations
outweigh the benefits derived from them,8 7 indicating that relying
on marketplace competition would be a more cost efficient method
of achieving the same result.
Another argument in favor of the deregulation, touched upon
only briefly by the FCC. in the TV Deregulation Notice"8 and by
the other proponents of the deregulation,89 is the continuing question

of whether such content regulations constitute a violation of the
first amendment rights of broadcasters. 90
Those who oppose the deregulation base their argument primarily
on the public interest standard of the Act and on the concept of
broadcasters as public trustees of the airwaves. 91 In addition, opponents claim that there is a lack of reliable statistical support for
85. See, e.g., Deregulation Notice, supra note 1; Comments of the National
Association of Broadcasters [hereinafter cited as NAB Comments]; Comments of
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. [hereinafter cited as ABC Comments] (Nov.
21, 1983) (on file at F.C.C., Washington, D.C.).
86. See Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 680; NAB Comments, supra note
85, at 7-10.
87. See Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 695; NAB Comments, supra note
85, at 10-12, Appendix A. The NAB had an independent communications research
firm conduct a cost/benefit analysis of the FCC's pre-deregulation ascertainment
and program logging requirements. It concludes that the costs to the licensee of
complying with these regulations outweigh the benefits that result from maintaining
the regulations (i.e., the degree to which these regulations insure that the licensees' programming is in the "public interest"). Id.; see also Deregulation Report
and Order, supra note 1, at 56.
88. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 695.
89. See NAB Comments and ABC Comments, supra note 85.
90. Although this argument has been made unsuccessfully in the past with regard
to content regulation of broadcast television, the question still exists and broadcasters
continue to fight for full first amendment rights. See infra notes 92-116 and
accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Comments of the Office of Communications of United Christ
Churches (Nov. 21, 1983) (on file at the F.C.C., Washington, D.C.); Reply Comments of the Office of Communications of United Christ Churches (U.C.C.) (Jan.
5, 1984) (on file at the F.C.C., Washington, D.C.). See also infra notes 135-46
and accompanying text on the public trustee concept.
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the economic and free marketplace competition arguments of the
92
deregulation proponents.
C.

Analysis of the Argument for Deregulation

1. The Competitive Marketplace
A common justification for the deregulation of the television
broadcast industry is the theory that it is preferable to allow an
industry to regulate itself through free marketplace competition rather
.than through government-imposed regulation. 93 Proponents of deregulation point out that, although self-regulation may not have been
a viable alternative in the early years of television, the industry has
grown to such an extent that it is, indeed, not only possible but
94
that it is already occurring.
Self-regulation through competition is preferable to government
regulation, according to its supporters, for several reasons. First,
effective self-regulation by definition requires less government supervision.95 Secondly, marketplace competition by its nature would
better serve the public interest; the public indicates its preference
by choosing one broadcast station over another. 95 Under the current
method, broadcasters present the FCC with documentary evidence
of phone interviews, surveys and conversations with community
leaders; the mere quantity of such documents might be used to
indicate the degree of effort on the part of the licensee to serve
the public. 96 Thus, as FCC Chairman, Mark S. Fowler, has noted,
92. Reply Comments of U.C.C., supra note 91, at 4-6.
93. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1980).
(a) agencies should achieve stated goals as effectively and efficiently as
possible without imposing unnecessary burdens on the public; (b) uniform
regulations and reporting requirements have, in numerous instances, imposed unnecessary and disproportionately burdensome demands upon
small businesses with limited resources; (c) regulations have adversely
affected competition in the marketplace, discouraged innovation and
restricted improvements in productivity; (d) pervasive regulations have
created barriers to entry; and, (e) unnecessary regulations may lead to
inefficient use of regulatory agency resources.
Id. (quoted in Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 694).
For a detailed discussion in support of this theory, see Fowler and Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fowler and Brenner].
94. See Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 692-93, Appendix A; NAB Com-

ments, supra note 85, at 7-10. See generally Fowler and Brenner, supra note 93.
95. See Fowler, The Public's Interest, 4 COM. AN) THE LAW Q. REV. 51 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as The Public's Interest].
96. See Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 696-98, Appendix A.
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"[b]roadcasting in the United States conforms little to the model
97
contemplated in the Commission's licensing philosophy."

Further, although in the past free competition may not have been
a viable alternative to FCC regulation because of the scarcity of

television stations, 98 it is clear that this is no longer the case. 99 The
number of television stations has increased steadily over the last
forty years.' °° Additionally, improvements in ultra-high frequency

(UHF) television,' 0 the introduction of new systems'012 such as low
power television, 03 multipoint distribution systems,' °4 direct broadcast
satellite, 05 and the advent of other alternatives such as video cassette

recorders, are contributing to the dramatic increase in competition
for the home-viewing audience.' ° 6 Perhaps the most important factor

97. Fowler and Brenner, supra note 93, at 208.
98. See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
99. "Competition to over-the-air broadcasting from new media has led to an
awareness that traditional broadcasting is just one of many information delivery
systems. Technological plenty is forcing a widespread reconsideration of the role
competition can play in broadcast regulation." Fowler and Brenner, supra note
93, at 209.
100. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1,at Appendix A. The numbered television
stations has increased from six stations in 1945 to 756 in 1981 (UHF and VHF Commercial stations).
101. Ultra-high frequency television (300-300MHz) (Channels 14-83). The first frequency assignment plan was based only on VHF channels (7-13) and it was not until
1952 that UHF channels were assigned. UHF lagged behind VHF in technological
development, however, improvements in reception of UHF signals continue to be
made and it is anticipated that the number of successful UHF stations will increase.
Geller, Television and Legal Problems in the-Decade of the 80's in LAW AND THE
TELEVISION OF THE 80's 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Geller].
102. For a decription of the new video services and their regulations, see Stern,
Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent
Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529 (1983).

103. Low Power Television (LPTV) is a new class of television operating at low
wattage. These stations have less coverage distance than regular UHF and VHF
and have only recently been approved for operation. See Low Power Television
Service, 51 R.R.2d 476 (1982).
104. Multi-point Distribution System (MDS) "is an omni-directional microwave
common carrier service that now brings pay-tv services like Home Box Office (HBO)
to homes, mostly in the large communities. It is also flourishing and will soon
obtain additional channels from the FCC, so that it can bring a number of pay
services." Geller, supra note 101, at 4.
105. Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) could bring additional channels directly
into the home from an orbiting satellite. Eight companies have received conditional
authorization to construct high power DBS systems, which could begin service as
early as 1986. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1,at 691-92; see also The Public
Interest, supra note 95.

106. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 691-92; see also Fowler and Brenner,
supra note 93; The Public's Interest, supra note 95.
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has been the rapid growth of cable television over the last thirty
years. 107
The FCC and the A.C. Nielsen Company, in separate studies,
report that almost all television households receive four or more
television signals,' °8 and the Nielsen report further states that over
sixty-five percent receive seven or more signals.' 0 9 Thus, despite the
natural limitations of the broadcast spectrum, marketplace competition continues to increase."10
The significance of these statistics to the public interest standard
in television broadcasting is clear. Increased competition for the
viewing public requires a greater knowledge of the public needs and
interests"' and an increased ability to serve those needs and interests."12 Furthermore, since many of the cable competitors provide
specialized programming such as the all-movie stations, all-musicvideo and all-sports stations, commercial television stations may have
to offer alternative programming such as increased local news and
public-issue oriented programming in order to compete successfully.
Finally, it is important to note that broadcast television's competition with other media such as cable, that have been subject to
little or no regulation," 3 places commercial television at a great
competitive disadvantage. Since commercial television is free to the
public, this disadvantage may not be in the public interest at all.

107. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 711, Appendix A, Table Il. Cable
has increased from 20 operating systems with 14,000 subscribers in 1952 to 4,825
operating systems with 21 million subscribers in 1982. Id.
108. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 689-90.
109. Id.
110. Proponents of the deregulation point out that television is not much different
in this respect from radio, which was "deregulated" in 1981. See supra note 1.
Indeed, if cable figures are taken into consideration, there were a total of 5,313
VHF-UHF stations and cable systems in 1981. By way of comparison, there were
8,451 authorized AM and FM radio stations in 1981. The difference has been
steadily decreasing. In 1970 the radio figures were 7,097 and the TV/cable figures
were only 3,362. See Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 710-11 (Appendix A).
111. Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1. The FCC points out that its
action "reflects the importance and viability of market incentives as a means of
achieving [their] regulatory objectives and will provide television broadcasters with
increased freedom and flexibility in meeting [those needs]." Id. at 2.
112. In fact, broadcast television stations already almost uniformly present a
higher percentage of the type of programming than is required under policy guide-

lines. See NAB Television ProgrammingStudy, Final Report on Local Commercial
Stations (1983) in NAB Comments, supra note 78, at Appendix B (NAB Television
Programming Study); see also Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 510.
113. See DAVIS, REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CABLE TELEVISION IN A NEW ERA (1983).
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The economic burden of compliance with the regulations, particularly the ascertainment requirements and logging rules, has increased
the disadvantage of commercial television licensees according to
proponents of the deregulation."1 4 In fact, they maintain that the
costs of compliance far outweighed whatever benefits arose from
5
regulation. 11
B.

The First Amendment and the Public Interest Standard

Although the Television Deregulation Notice and many of the
comments to it make slight mention of the first amendment aspect
of television content regulation,' 6 it is an important and ongoing
question relating to government regulation of the media. In the
Deregulation Report and Order, ' 7 while the FCC adopts a somewhat
more favorable position on the issue of first amendment rights, it
still fails to provide full first amendment protection for broadcasters.II
The Supreme Court has held that even the former degree of
content regulation did not violate the first amendment rights of

114. "The Commission estimates that the elimination of the ascertainment requirements will result in an annual savings of 66,956 work hours to the industry."
Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 25. Furthermore, the Commission
staff has estimated that the logging requirements impose a burden on commercial
television licensees which exceeds 2,468,000 work hours annually. Id. at 32.
115. See NAB Comments, supra note 85, at 10-11, 26, 44 & Appendix A (Appendix
A entitled A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the FCC's Ascertainment and Program Log
Requirements); see also Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 695-96.
116. Moreover, the case for revising and perhaps modifying our programming
policies becomes even more compelling when we remember that we are
dealing with rules and regulations that relate to the sensitive area of
program content. It is at least arguable that our programming guidelines
and commercialization policies impinge on a broadcaster's editorial discretion even though these guidelines have no substantive effect. If the
Commission's policies have limited continuing utility or if their viable
purposes may be achieved by less intrusive means, then the public interest
would seem better served by the elimination or modification of such
policies.
Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 695; see also NAB Comments, supra note

85, at 3; ABC Comments, supra note 85, at 15.
117. See supra note 1.
118. [W]e find that the present regulatory structure raises potential First
Amendment concerns. Congress intended private broadcasting to develop
with its public interest obligation. Moreover, the public interest standard
necessarily invited reference to First Amendment principles. These concerns with the First Amendment are exacerbated by the lack of a direct
nexus between a quantitative approach [to programming guidelines] and
licensee performance.
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although the deregulation may slightly reduce the

amount of content regulation, broadcasters still are not entitled to
full first amendment rights.

There are several theories on which the Court's conclusion regarding the first amendment issue has been based. First, there is
the "scarcity doctrine."' '

0

This argument is used to differentiate

between the treatment of broadcasting and other media, such as the
print media, with regard to the first amendment.' Since the number
of frequencies is limited and access is costly, the number of people
who have the opportunity to express themselves through the television
medium is very limited.122 Therefore, the FCC can require licensees
to conform to these content regulations in exchange for the privilege
of using broadcast frequencies.

2

1

A second theory, partially based on the notion of scarcity, is the
"public trustee" concept of broadcasting which provides that since
licensees do not own the frequencies but only are given the privilege
through licensing to use them for a limited time, they hold the
airwaves "in trust" for the public. 24 As trustees, the licensees have
a fiduciary-type duty to provide certain kinds of programming; as
non-owners of the medium, they do not have the right to use it

To the extent that existing levels of programming are market-dictated,
then it may be argued that the overall intrusive nature of the guidelines
is not pervasive. This does not mean, however, that there is no current
infringement on the editorial discretion of individual broadcasters. For
example, each licensee must still monitor its performance in light of this
government-imposed standard. Further, the continued existence of the
programming guidelines in the context of an evolving video services
marketplace could conceivably constitute an unacceptable general level
of infringement at some future time. In this regard, our action today
provides a less intrusive means of meeting our regulatory objectives.
Accordingly, we believe that our new regulatory approach is more consistent with underlying First Amendment values.
Deregulation Report and Order, supra note 1, at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
119. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (Court upheld FCC Chain
Broadcasting Regulations which provide that no license shall be granted to station
having specified relationship with a network); Bamford v. FCC, 535 F.2d 78
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976) (upheld ascertainment requirements).
120. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969) (upholding
Fairness Doctrine, supra note 76); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. at 226-27
(upholding Chain Broadcasting Regulations).
121. Compare Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional Florida "personal attack"
reply statute for newspapers).
122. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-92; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. at 226-27.
123. Id. See Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 555, 576 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Content Regulation].
124. See Content Regulation, supra note 123, at 582-83.
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for a completely free expression of their own views 125 and ideas. 26
Both the scarcity argument and the public trustee argument are
used to support the legitimacy of content regulation in broadcasting.1 27 In turn, content regulation, theoretically, insures diversity in
broadcasting which is viewed as the primary goal.'2 Diverse programming is in the public interest. 29 Recent articles on the subject
of broadcast regulation point out that the scarcity doctrine alone is
no longer an adequate or even logical explanation for treating the
broadcast medium differently from the print media in terms of first
amendment rights, particularly in view of the new technologies. 30
Although broadcast frequencies may be scarce in the sense that they
are limited by the finite nature of the spectrum and that it is expensive
to start a broadcast station, they are, in effect, no more scarce than
newspapers and probably not much more expensive. 3 ' Yet, the
125. Id.; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
126. Furthermore, the trusteeship models bring adverse economic implications.
In Fowler and Brenner, supra note 93, Commission Chairman Fowler and his legal
assistant point out:
[tihe responsibilities imposed under the trusteeship model turn an operator
into a super-citizen, with obligations that go beyond providing goods
and services that the public wants ....

The incidental costs of licensure

would vanish if there were no program-tied licensing criteria. Furthermore,
because the licenses have become imbued with a "community service"
character, they have lost some of their marketplace attributes. Consequently, broadcast licensees have been subjected to restrictions that bear
no relation to the marketplace.
Id. at 220.
127. Id.; see also Content Regulation, supra note 123.

128. Content Regulation, supra note 115; FCC v. Nat'l Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).

129. FCC v. Nat'l Comm. for Broadcpisting, 436 U.S. at 793-97 (1983); see also
FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (holding that Commission's
decision to ease regulations concerning radio station's format was not contrary to
public interest standard mandated by Communications Act because FCC provided
rational basis for its conclusion that reliance on market forces would promote
diversity and that diversity was in public interest).
130. See, e.g., Alienkoff, Some Unanswered Questionsabout the First Amendment
in NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Botein and Rice, eds. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Some Unanswered Questions]; Diefenderfer, Proposed Federal
Legislation and the Next Decade of Television in LAW AND TELEVISION OF THE 80's
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Legislation]; Fowler and Brenner,

supra note 93, at 221-26.
131.
Why is there a difference between television and newspapers - between
electronic and print media? Scarcity of frequencies has been cited again
and again and has always been disproved. There are more television

channels in most cities than there are newspapers, and there certainly
are more radio frequencies almost everywhere. It is no more expensive
to start a radio station than it is to start a newspaper in this country.
Some Unanswered Questions, supra note 130, at 157-58.
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scarcity doctrine still is espoused by the courts"a2 and by those who
favor strong government regulation of broadcasting.' 33
The public trustee doctrine is the second argument for affording
broadcasters more restricted first amendment rights. 3 4 The Communications Act specifically states that broadcast licensees shall have
the right to use but not to own channels of transmission. 3 ' Licensees
do not acquire a specific "property right" as a result of obtaining
a license, which is limited in duration and may be revoked or not
renewed if continuation or renewal is not in the public interest.' 3 6
Under the public trustee theory, licensees hold the frequencies "in
trust for the public;" they are required to serve the public interest.
This reasoning justifies the statutory fairness doctrine and the stringent FCC regulations which are meant to insure compliance
therewith.' 37 It is, therefore, the public's first amendment interest,
not the broadcast media's, which is paramount. 3 '
The public trustee theory is, however, difficult to reconcile with
other theories and judicial holdlings. For example, broadcasters, undoubtedly, are afforded some first amendment protection since the
Communications Act specifically prohibits censorship of broadcasters. 19 Yet, this prohibition has not been interpreted as the same
When examining the scarcity concept, it is interesting to observe that at
the time the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written, there were
only 32 newspapers in the entire nation of three million people. Total
circulation was no more than 40,000 a week. Today our nation has
grown to over 225 million people and there is a total of 9,676 newspaper
offerings (1,747 dailies and 7,929 weeklies or less than weeklies) and
10,873 periodicals... [I]n 1980 there were 8,933 radio stations and 1,020
television stations in the United States.
Proposed Federal Legislation, supra note 130, at 259 (footnotes omitted). In
addition, in 1980, there were 4,285 cable systems operating, with 16 million subscribers. Deregulation Notice, supra note 1, at 711, Appendix A, Table III.
132. See supra note 122.
133. See Comments of United Church of Christ, supra note 91; Reply Comments
of United Church of Christ, supra note 91.

134. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
135. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the
control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission;
and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership
thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted
by Federal Authority, and no such license shall be construed to create
any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Id.
136. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-75 (1940).
137. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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kind of proscription on censorship that the print media enjoys.' 40
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee,' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
broadcaster's refusal to accept editorial advertising constituted governmental action violative of the first amendment. 142 The Court stated
that "the concept of journalistic independence could not co-exist
with a reading of the challenged conduct of the licensee as governmental action."'' 43 It then addressed the issue of "whether the
various interests in free expression of the public, the broadcaster,
and the individuals require broadcasters to sell commercial time to
persons wishing to discuss controversial issues."' 4 The Court held
that such a right-of-access would infringe on the editorial discretion
of broadcasters and enlarge "[gjovernment control over the content
of broadcast discussion of public issues,' 41 5 thus sacrificing first
amendment protections. 4 6 It is clear from the Court's language in
the broadcast cases that, although broadcasters do have first amendment rights with regard to their broadcasts and although they must
have some editorial and journalistic discretion, the extent of these
47
rights is somewhat less than that of other media.
IV.

Conclusion

The deregulation of television by the FCC is likely to be beneficial
to both broadcasters and the public. The FCC's regulatory changes
should give broadcasters greater programming flexibility and encourage them to provide more innovative programming, thereby
providing program diversity without the burdens of governmentimposed regulations. Marketplace competition for viewers is likely
to insure that broadcasters make themselves aware of the public
interest and needs. The elimination of ascertainment requirements
and program logs also will reduce unnecessary economic burdens
on broadcasters as well as on the FCC.
However, since broadcasters still will be subject to the comparative
140. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 126.
Id.

147. See, e.g., Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the
Medium from the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163 (1982); Powe, "OR" of
the [Broadcast]Press, 55 TEx. L. REV. 39 (1976); Comment, The Future of Content
Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1981).

394
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system1 4 8 and, at least for now, still will be required to abide by
statutory rules, 149 it is equally conceivable that very little will change
in terms of programming. The FCC still will employ the same criteria
in granting licenses and renewals since the deregulation merely eliminates formal programming guidelines. Until program content is
eliminated completely as a measure for the granting of licenses,
broadcasters will never really have the full first amendment rights
enjoyed by other media. The deregulation is a step in the right
direction, but, in the end, it is only a small one.
Heidi R. Young
148. Under the current FCC administration, efforts are being made to reduce
regulation as much as possible and allow competition in the marketplace to govern.
See Middleton, A Clear Signal from the FCC, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1,
col. 2.
149. See supra note 83.

